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THE IMF AND AGOA: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONALITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund) and the 
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are fundamentally dis-
similar regimes with different purposes and goals.  The mission of the 
IMF is to monitor and stabilize the global economic currency system.1  
It is a member-based organization of nation-states that provides loans 
to countries in financial difficulties.  AGOA, on the other hand, is a 
unilateral trade preference regime offered by the U.S. government to 
benefit countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  Its purpose is to provide in-
creased trade opportunities as an incentive for countries to undertake 
political and economic reforms.2 
A common feature of the IMF and AGOA is, however, that both 
institutions impose conditions on their beneficiaries.  “Condition-
ality” in relations between developed and developing countries, spe-
cifically with regard to financial assistance and trade benefits, has 
long been a highly controversial topic.  Condemnation of IMF condi-
tionality has become something of an ethos among critics of the 
Fund.3  Along those lines, there have also been numerous complaints 
regarding the conditionality engrained in AGOA.4 
 
 1. See generally Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 
art. I, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 40 (as amended by the Second Amendment to the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, art. I, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 2205, 15 
I.L.M. 546, 547 (1976)) [hereinafter IMF Articles].  The text of the Second Amendment reprints 
the IMF Articles with all changes incorporated into the body of the full text.  But see Third 
Amendment of the Articles of Agreement Regarding the Suspension of Voting Rights, June 28, 
1990, 31 I.L.M. 1307 (1992) (amending Article XII, § 3(i), and Article XXVI, § 2, and adding 
Schedule L and paragraph 5 of Schedule D).  Hereinafter, citations to the IMF Articles will be 
to the printed sources for either the Second or Third Amendments as necessary.  The current 
full text is also available from the IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/aa/index.htm and http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 
2004). 
 2. See discussion infra in Part II. 
 3. See, e.g., Vivien Collingwood, Assistance with Fewer Strings Attached, in ETHICS & 
INT'L AFF., No. 1, at 55 (Carnegie Couns. Ethics & Int'l Aff. 2003) (critiquing IMF condition-
ality); Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 20 ("The IMF's 
recent emphasis on imposing major structural and institutional reforms as opposed to focusing 
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This note analyzes the manner in which conditions are applied in 
the IMF and AGOA regimes.  While the substance of the conditions 
is naturally dissimilar, we explicitly accept the premise that conditions 
have the potential to be an important tool in effecting positive change 
by influencing recipient country policies.  Thus, affirming the theo-
retical legitimacy of conditionality, the paper undertakes an analysis 
of how the IMF and AGOA use the conditions at their disposal, and 
whether such use is consistent with their missions and purposes. 
I.  DECONSTRUCTING ARGENTINA’S FAILURE 
If success has a thousand fathers, then Argentina has lately been 
an orphan.  Merely six years ago, Argentina was the darling of the 
IMF,5 and the country’s leaders bragged of the macroeconomic 
“miracle” that had transpired following the “lost decade” of the 
1980s.6  Since its default in December of 2001, the struggling nation 
has seen massive capital flight, followed by an inevitable influx of crit-
ics.7 
 
on balance-of-payments adjustments will have adverse consequences in both the short term and 
the more distant future."). 
 4. See, e.g., Jesse Jackson, Jr., Hope for Africa, NATION, Mar. 15, 1999, at 6 (arguing that 
AGOA "impose[s] on Africa the worst aspects of the International Monetary Fund's structural 
adjustment programs, major elements of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization, and left-
over provisions of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, while proffering illusive, short-
lived trade 'benefits'"); see also Chakravarthi Raghavan, Africa: NGOs start campaign against 
U.S. AGOA, THIRD WORLD NETWORK ONLINE, (Oct. 4, 2000) (reporting on African civil soci-
ety groups’ claims that AGOA “provides illusory benefits to African countries who in exchange 
are to provide real concessions to the United States and its firms"), at www.twnside.org.sg/     
title/agoa.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2004). 
 5. See MICHAEL MUSSA, ARGENTINA & THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY 1–2 
(2002); see also Bretton Woods Committee, Spotlight on Latin America, in CRITICAL ISSUES 
FORUM, Dec. 2002, at 5 (comments of Joseph Stiglitz, referring to Argentina as the "A-plus 
student of the IMF"), at http://www.brettonwoods.org/Critical%20Issues%20Latin%20 
America.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004). 
 6. See Domingo F. Cavallo & Joaquin A. Cottani, Argentina's Convertibility Plan and the 
IMF, AM. ECON. REV., May 1997, at 17. 
 7. See, e.g., Bretton Woods Committee, supra note 5, at 6–7 (comments of Adam Lerrick, 
blaming Argentina's malaise on populist social sentiment, strong labor unions, and big spend-
ing).  See also id. at 8 (comments of Morris Goldstein: "Argentina got into trouble because it 
didn't exercise sufficient fiscal discipline . . . because it allowed its external debt to become too 
large, because it stuck too long with a currency regime that permitted its real exchange rate to 
become uncompetitive, and because it refused for too long to restructure its debt . . ."); Mary 
Anastasia O'Grady, A Shocking Proposal: Let Brazil Find its Own Way, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 
2002, at A13 ("[R]igid [Argentine] labor laws and protectionism were destroying productivity 
and high taxes were choking off incentives to invest and produce."); James Petras, The Case of 
Argentina, SOCIAL POLICY, Summer 2002, at 6–7 ("The principle cause for decline and collapse 
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Given its history of providing significant financial and political 
support for Argentina’s economic policies during the 1990s, the IMF 
has unsurprisingly found itself to be the object of much of the criti-
cism.  Left-wing commentators assail the IMF for focusing on neo-
liberal economics while ignoring the increasingly stratified distribu-
tion of wealth between rich and poor.8  Predictably, conservatives 
take the opposite approach, blaming the IMF for allowing Argen-
tina’s leaders to delay the implementation of “sound money, low tax 
rates and freer trade policy.”9  Critics on both sides of the political 
spectrum have called for the IMF to “shut down.”10 
Of course, the collapse of an entire economy is unlikely to stem 
from a single factor, meaning that all of the above commentators are 
at least partially correct.  But much of the literature emerging over 
the past two years has overemphasized Argentina’s fiscal, monetary, 
and exchange policy instead of addressing the fundamental problems 
that have led Argentina from one financial crisis to another for dec-
ades.  In particular, we believe that Argentina will never achieve 
long-term growth and financial stability until it effectively reduces its 
rampant and infamous corruption.  Furthermore, we assert that IMF 
conditionality can be used as an effective tool in aiding Argentina in 
its struggle to clean up its government. 
A. Why Should Corruption Be Important to the IMF? 
It may seem odd to call for greater use of conditionality at the 
IMF, given the flood of criticism that IMF conditions, especially those 
that touch on “structural” considerations, have already received.11  
 
is located in neo-liberal structures of power and policies which facilitated pillage of the econ-
omy, massive corruption, and rising foreign debt . . . ."). 
 8. See, e.g., Petras, The Case of Argentina, supra note 7, at 6–7; A Stubborn Curse: Ine-
quality in Latin America, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2003, at 37 ("Historians, political scientists and 
left-wingers have long highlighted inequality as an important obstacle to development in Latin 
America."). 
 9. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Take Argentina Off Life Support, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 
2003, at A9. 
 10. See, e.g., O'Grady, A Shocking Proposal, supra note 7, at A13 ("[The] International 
Monetary Fund should get out of the bailout business and find a new line of work, or better yet, 
shut down. . . . What was once supposed to be insurance for developing countries that opened 
their capital markets and suffered 'external shocks' beyond their control has turned into a slush 
fund for populist big government."); Petras, supra note 7, at 7 ("The immediate cause of the col-
lapse of Argentine capitalism was the role of foreign owned banks and [industrial financial insti-
tutions], led by the International Monetary fund (IMF), in emptying the Argentine financial 
system."). 
 11. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.  But see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND (IMF), GUIDANCE ON THE DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION OF IMF CONDITIONALITY: 
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Some bemoan the fact that IMF conditions unduly infringe on the 
borrower-nation’s sovereignty, and urge the Fund to avoid condition-
ality wherever possible.12  Others would abandon conditionality for 
the simple reason that it is ineffective in imposing any financial disci-
pline.13  On the other hand, some argue that the IMF’s biggest mistake 
has not been its use of conditions, but its unwillingness to insist that 
the conditions be strictly followed.14 
Without endorsing any specific conditions, we find that condi-
tionality is particularly appropriate when a borrower’s primary prob-
lem is not a short-term liquidity crisis, but a deep-rooted flaw in the 
fundamentals of its economy.15  It can be argued that the IMF is not 
designed to treat such structural societal illnesses.16  But as long as the 
Fund chooses to remain at Argentina’s bedside, it would be foolish 
for it to perform cosmetic surgery on macroeconomic indicators while 
ignoring the underlying cancer of corruption. 
Corruption should be important to the IMF because it wastes the 
resources of borrower countries, thereby endangering their fiscal po-
sition and decreasing their ability to repay their external debts.  The 
 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2002) ("conditionality is indispensable to ensure that IMF 
financing goes hand in hand with appropriate policy action by the country receiving that financ-
ing"), at http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/053102.pdf (last visited Mar. 
19, 2004); Masood Ahmed et al., Refocusing IMF Conditionality, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2001, at 40, 
43 (indicating that imposing structural conditionality may be necessary where a country's eco-
nomic difficulties are caused by more than just fiscal and monetary imbalances). 
 12. Feldstein, supra note 3, at 27.  Feldstein is somewhat supported by the IMF Articles, 
which preclude the Fund from basing decisions on a borrower country's political or social 
choices.  See IMF Articles, art. IV, § 3(b), supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2209, 15 I.L.M. at 549 
("[Principles for the guidance of exchange rate policies] shall respect the domestic social and 
political policies of members . . . ."); see also IMF Articles, sched. C(4), 29 U.S.T. at 2263, 15 
I.L.M. at 580 ("The Fund shall not object [to a proposed par value for a member's currency] 
because of the domestic social or political policies of the member proposing the par value.").  
 13. See Bretton Woods Committee, supra note 5, at 7 (Lerrick states that "[o]fficial condi-
tionality has failed: of Argentina's 19 accords with the IMF, the country did not respect 15."). 
 14. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 17 (lamenting the IMF's failure "to press the Argentine au-
thorities as hard as it could have and should have to maintain a more prudent fiscal policy"). 
 15. Thus, Feldstein's critique of conditionality, which focused mostly on the IMF's handling 
of a short-term liquidity crisis in South Korea, is inapplicable to Argentina, where decades of 
economic dreams deferred cannot possibly be attributed to a short-term liquidity problem.  See 
Feldstein, supra note 3, at 25–27; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 995–96, 1009–10 (2000) (dis-
tinguishing sovereign debt crises that arise from shortages of liquidity from crises that have 
more fundamental root causes); cf. John H. Chun, "Post-Modern" Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did 
Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy Forum?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2659 (1996) (ar-
guing that the Mexican financial crisis of 1994–1995 was caused by liquidity rather than struc-
tural problems). 
 16. See Feldstein, supra note 3, at 20, 30. 
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IMF is required to conserve its resources responsibly,17 and therefore 
can only extend funding to countries that are reasonably likely to ser-
vice their loans.  When a substantial portion of revenue is wasted on 
graft, it becomes more difficult for a government to fulfill all of its 
domestic obligations while simultaneously keeping the deficit under 
control.  In addition, when corruption is uncontrolled, government of-
ficials will steal money that had been destined for development, thus 
hampering a country’s growth and reducing the future revenue avail-
able to service its loans.18 
The second justification for IMF involvement in the fight against 
corruption stems from the Fund’s duty to monitor its borrowers’ 
monetary policy.19  Corruption is relevant to monetary policy because 
central banks are unlikely to retain autonomy and independence from 
the political influence of corrupt regimes.  A politicized central bank 
will be pressured to lower interest rates in anticipation of elections, 
 
 17. Cf. IMF Articles, art. V, § 3(a), supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2211, 15 I.L.M. at 550 ("The 
Fund will . . . establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of [its] general re-
sources . . . ."). 
 18. See John Githongo, Corruption as a Problem in the Developing World: Effects on the 
Economy and Morale, Address at the Seminar on Corruption and Development Co-operation 
held by the Government of Finland (May 2000) ("Corruption is now accepted as a major inter-
national scourge that undermines economic, political and social development.") (transcript 
available at http://www.transparency.org/speeches/githongo.html (last visited March 19, 2004)); 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, pmbl., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
105-39, at 1–2, 35 I.L.M. 724, 727 ("The member states of the Organization of American States, 
[are] convinced that corruption . . . strikes at . . . the comprehensive development of peo-
ples . . . ."), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html (last visited Mar. 
19, 2004); cf. Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Setting the Stage, in AFTER THE WASHINGTON 
CONSENSUS: RESTARTING GROWTH AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 21, 29 (Pedro-Pablo 
Kucynski & John Williamson eds., 2003) (noting that development requires substantial public 
spending in "productive investment expenditure especially on education and basic infrastruc-
ture"); Pedro-Pablo Kucynski, Reforming the State, in id. 33, 34 (noting that in Latin America 
"[c]rucial sectors—such as the administration of education, health care, and public infrastruc-
ture—suffer from political interference, lack of a career path for civil servants, and pay that is 
substantially lower than in comparable private-sector positions” often resulting in a “confronta-
tional attitude toward the private sector—and sometimes corruption and ineptitude"). 
 Mussa implies that Argentina's crisis was caused by a congenital tendency of the govern-
ment to "spend significantly more than it could raise in taxes."  MUSSA, supra note 5, at 10.  But 
chronic deficits are a hallmark of practically every democracy, since politicians hate to choose 
between raising taxes and cutting popular spending programs.  See The Red and the Black, 
ECONOMIST, May 26, 2001, at 76.  Of course, not every democracy suffers from Argentina's re-
peated financial crises.  Perhaps a more accurate explanation for Argentina's dilemma is that 
corruption has persistently stunted Argentina's growth, thereby inhibiting the country's ability 
to maintain long-term deficits comparable to most democracies. 
 19. See IMF, GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY 3 (2002) (describing monetary policy as a 
"core area of responsibility" for the IMF), at http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/ 
guid/092302.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2004). 
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thereby subjecting the economy to overheating and reducing currency 
stability.  Furthermore, central bankers beholden to political consid-
erations will be tempted to monetize the fiscal deficit, a solution that 
inevitably leads to hyperinflation and financial disaster.20 
Some countries, including Argentina, seek to maintain the inde-
pendence of central banks by enacting laws that forbid the dismissal 
of the Central Bank’s governor without cause.21  But when corruption 
pervades an entire government, the authorities of the Central Bank 
will often be influenced by either outright bribes or more subtle po-
litical manipulation.  Even if the Central Bank somehow maintains its 
integrity, the political leaders who disagree with its policies can easily 
find “cause” to effect the governor’s removal. 
This is exactly what happened to Pedro Pou, the widely re-
spected former governor of Argentina’s Central Bank.  When Pou re-
fused to adopt the policy recommendations of Argentina’s economy 
minister, the government conveniently discovered a link between Pou 
and certain money-laundering operations and dismissed him.22  The 
scandal compromised investors’ already shaky confidence in Argen-
tina’s monetary system.23  It thus demonstrated that corruption is not 
just a “political consideration,” but also a key determinant of a coun-
try’s monetary stability, and therefore a legitimate concern for the 
IMF.  The illicit flow of government funds to the well-connected is of-
ten considered the “underlying cause of Argentina’s financial catas-
trophe.”24  But despite an overwhelming consensus of corruption’s 
impact on development, the IMF has afforded little more than lip ser-
vice to the problem.25 
 
 20. See MUSSA, supra note 5, at 20 (noting that printing money to finance deficit spending 
had historically caused rapid inflation in Argentina). 
 21. See id. at 39. 
 22. See id.  Pou may have been guilty, or he may have been the innocent victim of a regime 
that was willing and able to go to any lengths to get its way.  In either case, Pou's dismissal ex-
emplifies how corruption undermines the independence of central banks.  Ironically, the econ-
omy minister was himself arrested on corruption charges about a year later.  Enter the Scape-
goat, ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 2002, at 35. 
 23. MUSSA, supra note 5, at 39. 
 24. Matt Moffett, Local Battle: One Tough Mayor Shows Argentina How to Clean House, 
WALL ST. J., July 1, 2003, at A1; Celeste Boeri, Note, How to Solve Argentina's Debt Crisis: Will 
the IMF's Plan Work?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 245, 250 (2003) ("Argentina is so rife with political 
corruption that it can hardly implement its own reforms."); see also supra notes 21–23 and ac-
companying text. 
 25. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text; see also IMF, EXPERIMENTAL REPORT 
ON TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES: ARGENTINA Box 1 (1999) (noting that the IMF "has not un-
dertaken an assessment of the quality of the data disseminated" by Argentine authorities), at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/arg/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) [hereinafter 
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For example, in a postmortem analysis of what went wrong, the 
former director of the Department of Research at the IMF writes ex-
tensively about Argentina’s macroeconomic conditions but hardly 
mentions corruption.26  In other words, when the chief researcher for 
Argentina’s largest lender evaluates the reasons for his former client’s 
collapse, he focuses on the country’s congenital habit of spending be-
yond its means, but completely ignores where the money ended up.27  
Such negligence would be unthinkable for a private lender,28 and 
should not be tolerated in an organization charged with promoting 
“development of the productive resources of all members.”29 
Of course, it is one thing for the IMF to make the fight against 
corruption a priority, and quite another for it to be effective at reduc-
ing it.  Indeed, we know of no silver bullet for this longstanding and 
pervasive problem.30  Nonetheless, we argue that the IMF could effec-
 
EXPERIMENTAL REPORT]; cf. IMF, STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY IN FUND-SUPPORTED 
PROGRAMS 42 (2001) ("[C]hanges in the legal and institutional framework . . . accounted for 
less than 10 percent of the structural conditions in transition economies in the second half of the 
1990s.").  Fortunately, the IMF has recently begun to take corruption more seriously.  Last De-
cember the Fund refused to bail out the Dominican Republic after it became clear that the gov-
ernment was not committed to addressing the "cronyism, corruption, lax regulation and se-
crecy" that precipitated a recent banking crisis.  Dominican Republic in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
29, 2003, at A16 (editorial); see also generally IMF, How Does the IMF Encourage Greater Fiscal 
Transparency? (Apr. 2003), at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fiscal.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 
2004); IMF, GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY, supra note 19, at 2 ("In helping members to 
devise economic and financial programs, the Fund will pay due regard to . . . their administrative 
capacity to implement reforms.").  For more, see generally the EXPERIMENTAL REPORT, supra. 
 26. See MUSSA, supra note 5, at 9–16; see also Flemming Larsen, Agentina and the IMF: 
the need for perspective, Address at the International Cooperation and Solidarity in Latin 
America Week, Pôle Universitaire Européen de Toulouse (Nov. 18, 2003) (mentioning "weak 
governance" but declining to give the IMF a role in anything other than macroeconomic policy) 
(transcript available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/111803.htm (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2004)). 
 27. Mussa's failure to address corruption is especially glaring in light of the arrest of Do-
mingo Cavallo on corruption charges.  See Enter the Scapegoat, supra note 22, at 55.  Cavallo 
was the renowned architect of Argentina's Convertibility Plan and was one of the key figures 
involved in negotiations with the IMF.  MUSSA, supra note 5, at 37. 
 28. To illustrate by way of example, imagine two companies, X and Y, neither of whom 
have any assets or liabilities.  Thus, both companies have equivalent fiscal situations.  Suppose 
that both companies approach a bank, B, requesting equivalent loans to finance a new factory, 
and that B can only supply one loan.  Further suppose that X is likely to succeed in the project 
while Y (due to corrupt corporate governance) is likely to have the funds embezzled or other-
wise wasted.  With all other things being equal, B's resources would be more wisely spent on a 
loan to X.  But if B focuses only on X and Y's fiscal positions without investigating how they 
spend their money, then B will sometimes loan to Y. 
 29. IMF Articles art. I(ii), supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2205, 15 I.L.M. at 547. 
 30. See Peter Eigen, Preface to JEREMY POPE, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL SOURCE 
BOOK 2000: CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL INTEGRITY 
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tively reduce corruption in certain circumstances by adopting the 
proposals described below. 
B. How Can the IMF Use Conditionality to Reduce Corruption? 
The most direct manner in which the IMF could control the fi-
nances of its borrowers is by conditioning loan approval on reducing 
corruption.  However, such an overarching policy would be far more 
easily articulated than carried out in practice, as the IMF has neither 
the resources nor the mandate to police every dollar of government 
spending.31 
Nonetheless, the IMF could at least monitor what John Githongo 
describes as “looting, . . . the kind of scams whose figures are so huge 
that when they are successfully concluded they have macroeconomic 
implications fairly quickly.”32  If the IMF declared that such theft 
would be factored into its decision-making process, corrupt leaders 
might become more hesitant to steal.33 
The IMF could also use conditionality to control corruption in an 
indirect, although perhaps more effective, manner.  Namely, it should 
condition loan guarantees on the borrower’s disclosure of budgetary 
information.  The IMF Articles of Agreement require member coun-
tries to furnish information on macroeconomic indicators and ex-
change reserves, but do not demand the publication of government 
 
SYSTEM, at xv (2000) (lamenting that "corruption will . . . always be with us"), http://www. 
transparency.org/sourcebook/index.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). 
 31. Cf. Feldstein supra note 3, at 27 (arguing that even the more limited conditions in use 
today unduly infringe on borrowers' sovereignty). 
 32. See Githongo, supra note 18.  Other aid organizations such as the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank may be better suited to police smaller-scale corruption in 
the projects they fund.  See Eduardo Wills Herrera & Nubia Urueña Cortés, South America, in 
TRANSPARENCY INT'L., GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2003, at 103, 104 (Robin Hodess ed., 
2002), http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2003.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).  On the 
other hand, the World Bank has had trouble policing corruption in practice.  See, e.g., infra note 
112. 
 33. Although we call for the IMF to condition loans on making progress in the fight against 
corruption, we do not suggest that it give an ultimatum to all borrower countries to clean up or 
face an immediate end to all IMF financing.  Instead, corruption should be taken into account 
among other factors when reviewing a borrower's IMF program.  A failure to reduce corruption 
need not by itself cut off a country's access to Fund resources, but would be one of several con-
ditions that, if unmet in sufficient numbers, would ultimately doom a country's program.  See 
IMF, CONDITIONALITY IN FUND-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS—POLICY ISSUES 17 (2001) (discuss-
ing the "critical mass" of failed structural benchmarks that could cut off a country from IMF 
funding), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/policy/index.htm (last visited Mar. 
26, 2004).  Such an approach could admittedly be applied in an unpredictable fashion, but it has 
the advantage of giving the IMF sufficient flexibility to use conditionality in a way that best suits 
each borrower's unique situation. 
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budgets.34  In fact, Article VIII specifically forbids the IMF from 
compelling members “to furnish information in such detail that the 
affairs of individuals or corporations are disclosed.”35  Such self-
imposed secrecy does nothing to advance the purposes of the IMF,36 
and serves only to protect well-connected actors who have something 
to hide about their incomes.37 
By demanding disclosure of borrower country spending, the IMF 
would help reduce corruption by providing citizens of borrower coun-
tries a greater opportunity to scrutinize how their tax money is being 
spent.38  Furthermore, if Article VIII were amended, the IMF could 
demand that politicians and other high-ranking officials in borrower 
countries disclose their personal financial information.  Such a move 
could substantially increase the accountability and credibility of gov-
ernments in the developing world.39  And unlike other structural con-
ditions, which depend on the borrower government keeping its prom-
ises after coming to an agreement with the IMF, disclosure 
requirements could be enforced before any money is disbursed, thus 
ensuring a greater level of compliance than is typical for most IMF 
programs. 
 
 34. See IMF Articles, art. VIII, § 5, supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2224–26, 15 I.L.M. at 558; see 
also id., art. IV, § 3(b), 29 U.S.T. at 2209, 15 I.L.M. at 549.  In Argentina, the IMF acknowledges 
that "coverage of general government transactions . . . is limited, and published information on 
extrabudgetary funds, tax expenditures, and contingent liabilities is partial or unavailable."  
EXPERIMENTAL REPORT, supra note 25, para. 11. 
 35. IMF Articles art. VIII, § 5(b), supra note 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2225, 15 I.L.M. at 558. 
 36. See id. art. I, 29 U.S.T. at 2205, 15 I.L.M. at 547 (outlining the purposes of the IMF). 
 37. Cf. Eigen, supra note 30, at xv ("The belief that increased transparency can achieve not 
only more meaningful levels of accountability, but can do so in a highly cost-effective fashion, is 
now expressed universally."); ROBERT MARTIN & ESTELLE FELDMAN, ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 14–19 (1998) (Transparency International working 
paper) (advocating access to governmental information generally), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/working_papers/martin-feldman/2-why.html (last visited Mar. 26, 
2004). 
 38. Thus, by demanding financial openness, the IMF will be able to utilize the democratic 
infrastructures of recipient countries to ensure that conditions which directly require good gov-
ernance are actually followed.  In other words, financial disclosure can ensure that good govern-
ance requirements are not reduced to mere surplusage.  See supra note 25 (illustrating the IMF's 
failure, notwithstanding its rhetoric, to encourage good governance in lender countries) and 
AGOA analysis infra (concluding that AGOA's good governance requirement has not been 
taken seriously). 
 39. See POPE, supra note 30, at 235; A Fight Against Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2003, 
at A28 ("If public servants must declare their wealth . . . and can be fired if caught lying, they 
are deterred from buying a Mercedes or a beach house.").  Such conditions would be analogous 
to disclosure requirements of certain U.S. federal and state election laws.  See, e.g., GA. CODE 
ANN. § 21-5-50 (2003). 
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In recent months the IMF has taken steps in the direction of full 
disclosure, and it should be applauded for its efforts.  On October 10, 
2003, the IMF announced that many country documents would be 
presumed publishable unless the country in question objected.40  More 
importantly, the Managing Director will recommend that the Board 
decline approval of new programs for countries with exceptional ac-
cess to IMF resources that do not consent to the publication of mate-
rial.41  These moves will not only improve the efficacy of Fund-
supported programs, but they will also boost the credibility of the 
IMF as an institution. 
Of course, using disclosure and corruption as conditions for IMF 
programs is an imperfect solution, subject to numerous criticisms.  
For example, some might consider corruption to be too vague a 
benchmark to measure in an objective fashion.42  In fact, corruption 
has already been measured in a number of ways, such as through 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and as 
part of the qualifying criteria for the U.S. government’s Millennium 
Challenge Account.43  These indices may not be perfect gauges, but 
the same could be said about many of the macroeconomic indicators 
traditionally used by the IMF.44  Furthermore, although imperfect sta-
tistics may not be appropriate tools for judges to use in deciding ques-
tions of law, they are well-suited to constitute factors in the IMF’s 
“critical mass” decision-making process.45 
Another potential criticism of the use of conditions to fight cor-
ruption is that, like all types of structural conditionality, they “substi-
tute [the IMF’s] technical judgments for the outcomes of the nation’s 
political process.”46  However, even those who generally oppose struc-
 
 40. IMF Takes Another Step to Increase Its Openness, 32 IMF SURV. 297–98 (2003). 
 41. Id. at 298.  The new policy applies specifically to "Use of Fund Resources" and "Post 
Program Monitoring" reports.  Id.  This suggests a new-found IMF focus on monitoring spend-
ing of funds.  See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
 42. This criticism would not apply to disclosure requirements, as the financial information 
that must be disclosed could easily be delineated in advance. 
 43. See Press Release, Transparency Int'l, Nine out of Ten Developing Countries Urgently 
Need Practical Support to Fight Corruption, Highlights New Index 2–3 (Oct. 7, 2003), 
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html (last visited Mar. 
26, 2004); Lael Brainard, The Millennium Challenge Account & Foreign Assistance, BROOKINGS 
REV., Spring 2003, at 42. 
 44. See, e.g., IRVIN B. TUCKER, MACROECONOMICS FOR TODAY 126–28 (2000) (question-
ing the value of GDP as a measurement of a nation's income). 
 45. See supra note 33. 
 46. See Feldstein, supra note 3, at 27. 
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tural conditionality47 might accept our proposals because, for the fol-
lowing reasons, they do not suffer from the same deficiencies as other 
structural conditions. 
First, many IMF structural conditions are assailed for being in-
fluenced by some kind of ideological bias.48  In contrast, conditions re-
lating to corruption are ideologically neutral.  They do not tell a gov-
ernment how much money it should spend, or what its spending 
priorities should be.  Their only aim is to ensure that public spending 
be applied for the public good and not for some official’s personal 
gain. 
In addition, IMF conditions have often pitted the Fund against 
its borrowers’ populations—the very people whom the IMF purports 
to help.49  Yet IMF action against corruption would probably elicit far 
more popular support, since corruption is a scourge that is over-
whelmingly condemned the world over.50  Moreover, disclosure re-
quirements are unlikely to engender popular opposition, because they 
do not require popular sacrifice.51 
Some conditions have been criticized for depriving a borrower 
country of “ownership” of its economic agenda, thereby dooming any 
Fund program to failure.  In other words, IMF programs that do not 
have the support of the borrower government are unlikely to be fully 
implemented no matter what carrots or sticks the Fund offers to se-
cure compliance.52  But conditions that decrease corruption will only 
 
 47. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 48. The accusations have come from both the Left and the Right.  See supra notes 7–9 and 
accompanying text for a selection of IMF critiques from all sides of the political spectrum.  
Though the authors are often directly at odds with each other on substance, they all tend to ac-
cuse the IMF of being biased towards either the Left or the Right.  Conditions that are vulner-
able to charges of ideological bias include IMF-influenced privatizations, tax increases, deregu-
lation of industry and of capital controls, and austerity measures. 
 49. See, e.g., Eliseo Gardel, No llores por FMI Argentina [Don't cry for the IMF, 
Argentina], at http://www.nodo50.org/patrialibre/sifuturo/argentina.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2003); Richard H. Robbins, Anti-IMF/World Bank Protests in the Global South 1976-2001 (a 
partial list), at http://faculty.plattsburgh.edu/richard.robbins/legacy/Anti-IMF%20Protests% 
201976-2001.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2003). 
 50. Eigen, supra note 30, at xix (noting "the degree of public outrage that has accompanied 
the fall" of corrupt leaders and dismissing the notion that "corruption is a matter of 'culture'").  
The IMF can also improve the popularity of corruption-related conditions by involving elements 
of local civil society, such as Poder Ciudadano in Argentina.  See generally Poder Ciudadano 
website (select link to "Relaciones Internationales"), at http://www.poderciudadano.org.ar (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2003). 
 51. Of course, they may end up requiring (long overdue) sacrifices from corrupt leaders. 
 52. See Allan Drazen, Conditionality & Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy 
Approach, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 36, 40 (2002). 
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improve a country’s ownership of its program, because a government 
with less corruption is naturally more responsive to the public rather 
than to the unknown and unpredictable demands of those who pur-
chase influence. 
Finally, the requirement that governments disclose their expendi-
tures may be seen as too intrusive on a sovereign’s prerogative to 
keep state secrets.  In light of the horrifying recent histories of some 
of the recipients of IMF aid, one might question the wisdom of allow-
ing any kind of secrecy in such governments.53  Nevertheless, as long 
as the United States and other developed countries continue to har-
bor state secrets, it would be difficult to require absolute openness 
from the developing world.  Here, the IMF could compromise be-
tween state sovereignty and the need for governmental transparency 
by allowing recipient countries to designate a small percentage of 
their expenditures as classified.  At the same time, a borrower coun-
try’s right to limited secrecy would not compromise the duty of gov-
ernment officials to report all sources of personal income.  Thus, cor-
rupt leaders would have little room to hide illicit payoffs under the 
guise of national security. 
II.  INTRODUCTION TO AGOA 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),54 passed by 
the U.S. Congress as part of the Trade and Development Act of 
2000,55 has been heralded as providing sub-Saharan African states 
with unprecedented benefits and opportunities.56  AGOA offers re-
 
 53. For example, in Argentina an estimated 10,000 people were killed by clandestine mili-
tary squads during the nation's "dirty war" of the 1970s and 1980s.  Hector Tobar, Revolution 
Was One of Their 3 Rs, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2003, at A1. 
 54. African Growth and Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3747 (2000) [hereinafter 
AGOA]. 
 55. Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000) (codi-
fied throughout 19 U.S.C. (2000)) [hereinafter Trade and Development Act]. 
 56. See The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, S. HRG. NO. 108-187, at 8 (2003) (prepared statement of Florizelle B. Liser, 
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa) ("AGOA is . . . stimulating economic growth, 
helping sub-Saharan Africa integrate into the global economy, increasing opportunities for U.S. 
exports and businesses, supporting African reforms, and encouraging a solid U.S.-Africa trade 
partnership."), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_ 
senate_hearings&docid=f:90449.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter AGOA Foreign 
Relations Hearing]; see also 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH 
AND OPPORTUNITY ACT, THIRD OF EIGHT ANNUAL REPORTS,  H.R. DOC. NO. 108-74, at 4, 7 
(2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003agoa.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2004) ("U.S. 
imports under AGOA were valued at $9 billion in 2002, a 10 percent increase from 2001.") 
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forming sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the U.S. 
market, covering 1,800 items in addition to the 4,600 products con-
tained under the General System of Preferences (GSP) offered to 
other developing countries.57 
The president is required to certify AGOA-candidate countries 
annually.58  The determinative eligibility criteria demand that a coun-
try “has established, or is making continual progress toward establish-
ing,” inter alia, 
(A) a market-based economy that protects private property 
rights; . . . 
(B) the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due proc-
ess, a fair trial, and equal protection under the law; . . . 
(C) the elimination of barriers to United States trade and invest-
ment[, including national treatment of foreign investors and the 
protection of intellectual property rights;] 
(D) economic policies to reduce poverty, increase the availability 
of health care and educational opportunities; . . . 
(E) a system to combat corruption and bribery[; and] . . . 
(F) protection of internationally recognized worker rights, includ-
ing the right of association, [and] the right to organize and bargain 
collectively.59 
Additionally, AGOA’s conditions stipulate that the president is au-
thorized to designate a country eligible only if it “does not engage in 
activities that undermine United States national security or foreign 
policy interests;” and “does not engage in gross violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights or provide support for acts of inter-
national terrorism and cooperates in international efforts to eliminate 
human rights violations and terrorist activities.”60 
This long list of eligibility criteria identifies many of the most 
pervasive problems of the region, where the vestiges of colonialism 
and subsequent misadministration still manifest themselves in “con-
tinuing conflict in some countries and regions, weak institutions and 
leadership, disunity among racial, linguistic, religious, and tribal 
 
[hereinafter 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT].  About seventy-five percent of the imports are 
petroleum products.  Id. at 18. 
 57. See William Cline, Trading Up: Strengthening AGOA's Development Potential, CTR. 
FOR GLOBAL DEV. BRIEF, June 2003, at 3, at http://www.cgdev.org/docs/cgdbrief6.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2004). 
 58. AGOA § 106. 
 59. Id. § 104. 
 60. Id. § 104(2)–(3). 
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groups, corruption, and poor governance.”61  Consequently, while 
many sub-Saharan African countries have made enormous progress 
toward more open and democratic political systems, the region still 
lags behind the rest of the world in virtually every category of devel-
opment.62  Thus, in light of the numerous conditions, it might come as 
a surprise that thirty-eight of forty-eight sub-Saharan African coun-
tries were certified under AGOA in 2003.63  Only seven countries 
were deemed ineligible in 2003, and three countries did not apply for 
participation in the program.64  As of January 2004, two countries 
were removed from the list (Central African Republic and Eritrea), 
while Angola was added by presidential proclamation.65 
A. The Apparel Provision 
A widely criticized element of AGOA is in fact not a formal 
condition, but rather a provision related to the export of apparel 
products to the United States.  Unlimited duty-free exports of textiles 
and apparels are allowed only if they are produced with American 
raw materials.66  Currently, due to market conditions, many apparel 
producers in sub-Saharan Africa receive their yarns from outside the 
 
 61. BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 
SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. RECORD 2002–2003, at 11, avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
 62. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
INDEX REVEALS DEVELOPMENT CRISIS, in HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, at 4E1 
(2003) ("Almost all of the 'low human development countries' at the bottom of the Index are in 
sub-Saharan Africa: 30 out of a total of 34."), http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/presskit 
/HDR03_PR4E.pdf (last visited June 30, 2004); see also FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE 
WORLD 2003: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 11 (2003) 
(reporting that only 11 African countries can be considered "free") [hereinafter FREEDOM 
HOUSE 2003]. 
 63. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 1. 
 64. See generally Results of the AGOA Country Review for 2003 Eligibility, at 
http://www.agoa.gov/2003_eligibility_results.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
 65. See Proclamation 7748, 69 Fed. Reg. 227, 228 (Jan. 2, 2004). 
 66. AGOA § 112.  Apparel made from fabrics originating in other AGOA countries may 
also be exported duty-free to the United States, but must not exceed a cap set by the U.S. 
government, which was recently raised to 3 percent of all U.S. imports and will rise to 7 percent 
by 2008 under AGOA II.  See Cline, supra note 57, at 4.  A temporary apparel exception for 
least developed countries, allowing imports into the U.S. regardless of the origin of the yarn, 
will expire in September 2004.  Cline, supra note 57, at 3; see also AADITYA MATTOO ET AL., 
THE AFRICA GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT AND ITS RULES OF ORIGIN: GENEROSITY 
UNDERMINED? 7–8 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2908, 2002), 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/20742_wps2908.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
091504 FUHR.DOC 10/18/2004  9:56 AM 
2004] CONDITIONALITY IN THE IMF AND AGOA 139 
continent, often from Asia.67  As a result, “the rules of origin re-
quirements in the apparel sector . . . will significantly reduce exports 
below [sub-Saharan Africa’s] full potential.”68 
The rule-of-origin provisions are, however, not the only problem 
pertaining to apparel products.  In order to export duty-free apparel 
into the United States, sub-Saharan African countries must obtain a 
“visa” issued by the United States Trade Representative (USTR).69  
This visa requires countries to modernize domestic laws and institute 
highly technical administrative and enforcement procedures to pre-
vent the unlawful transshipment of articles and the use of counterfeit 
documents and products.70  Due to the weak technical capacity of 
most sub-Saharan African countries, only nineteen of the thirty-eight 
AGOA countries have obtained this visa certification.71 
B. Importance of Foreign Investment 
Additionally, the president has the authority to suspend duty-
free apparel imports if they “cause serious damage, or threat thereof” 
to the domestic U.S. industry.72  While the provision has not yet been 
invoked, it is indicative of a fundamental structural flaw of the re-
gime.73  This imbalance of power, allowing the president to revoke 
 
 67. Currently, due to market conditions, many apparel producers in sub-Saharan Africa 
receive their yarns from outside the continent, often in Asia.  See, e.g., Helmo Preuss, SA Has 
Not Used AGOA to Best Advantage (Sept. 9, 2003), at http://business.iafrica.com 
/features/269064.htm ("Clothing manufacturers cannot source all the fabric they need from 
South African textile producers.  That means they cannot expand their exports to the US due to 
the stringent rules of origin.") (last visited June 30, 2004). 
 68. MATTOO ET AL., supra note 66, at 17.  Without the apparel exports rule, the volume of 
African exports into the United States would be five times higher.  Id. 
 69. Trade and Development Act § 113(1)(A). 
 70. Id.; see also AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 28 (prepared state-
ment of Stephen Hayes, President, Corporate Council on Africa) ("[M]any of Africa's small 
businesses are confronted with a myriad of confusing and complicated standards imposed upon 
them by their own governments as they seek to comply with AGOA visa provisions.  It would 
be useful for the U.S. government to work more closely with national customs agencies in Af-
rica to find ways to explain better and/or simplify the AGOA certification requirements for Af-
rican small and medium businesses."). 
 71. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 9.  As a result of the visa re-
quirement, only 38 percent of apparel from AGOA countries was exported to the U.S. duty-free 
in 2001.  Cline, supra note 57, at 3. 
 72. AGOA § 112 (b)(3)(C)(ii). 
 73. The World Trade Organization, via the so-called Enabling Clause, permits developed 
countries to offer unilateral non-reciprocal preferential treatment to products originating from 
developing countries under the General System of Preferences (GSP).  Arrangements such as 
AGOA go beyond the traditional GSP, in that they attach specific conditions as a prerequisite 
for developing countries receiving the GSP benefits.  As AGOA is effectively a GSP+ system, it 
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benefits unilaterally, injects uncertainty into potential investors’ plans 
to become active in sub-Saharan Africa.74  AGOA is scheduled to ex-
pire in 2008, and thus any long-term investor will likely hesitate to 
expend a large amount of capital in a country that may not see pref-
erential market access at the end of the decade.75  In fact, the lack of 
foreign direct investment under AGOA has been identified as a ma-
jor disappointment.76  A World Bank study expresses the view that in-
creases in foreign investment are central to the economic growth of 
sub-Saharan Africa.77  The authors found that open market access 
alone without accompanying foreign investment will result in a mere 
0.4% increase in non-oil exports and hardly any change in the welfare 
of sub-Saharan African countries.78 
In light of this data, it comes as no surprise that AGOA aims to 
facilitate foreign investment in the region.79  The U.S. government has 
numerous tools at its disposal to induce investment, many of which 
are underutilized at best.80  Yet even the best efforts to urge corpora-
tions to invest abroad can only be negligible compared to the impor-
tance of an attractive climate on the ground.  No rational investor will 
throw his money down the metaphorical bottomless pit.  In the words 
of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “[c]apital is a coward.  It flees 
 
does not include reciprocal obligations on its members.  Unlike a bilateral or multilateral free-
trade agreement, which imposes mutual rights and duties on its parties, the unilateral nature of 
AGOA lets both the developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the "benefactor," the 
United States, off the hook.  The performance conditionality inherent in such GSP+ programs 
has recently been struck down by a WTO Panel in a case brought by India against the European 
Communities (EC).  The EC has appealed the Panel decision, which could potentially mark the 
end of conditionality in programs such as AGOA or the EU's Contonou Agreement. 
 74. Cf. Cline, supra note 57, at 4 (arguing AGOA be reformed to grant qualifying African 
nations assured eligibility for five years, allowing for presidential revocation only in "extreme 
circumstances, such as when a government has been deposed by force"). 
 75. Several members of Congress have urged an extension of AGOA benefits, and Presi-
dent Bush has indicated his support to extend AGOA beyond 2008.  See, e.g., Jim Fisher-
Thompson, U.S. Lawmaker Calls for an AGOA III at Mauritius Forum, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. INT'L 
INFO. PROGRAMS, Jan. 17, 2003, at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/trade/a3011701.htm 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004). 
 76. See AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 26–27 (prepared statement of 
Stephen Hayes). 
 77. See generally ELENA IANCHOVICHINA ET AL., UNRESTRICTED MARKET ACCESS FOR 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: HOW MUCH IS IT WORTH AND WHO PAYS? (World Bank Develop-
ment Research Group Paper 2001), at http://www.eldis.org/ static/doc9124.htm (last visited May 
24, 2004). 
 78. See id. at 2.  The study bemoans the "neglect of investment" in the region.  Id. at 22. 
 79. AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 26 (prepared statement of Stephen 
Hayes) ("[T]he act is intended to serve as an investment tool for U.S. companies seeking Afri-
can partners.") 
 80. Id. at 10. 
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war.  It flees disease.  It won’t go near corruption.”81  Unstable gov-
ernments, pervasive nepotism, lack of judicial independence, human 
rights abuses, non-transparent political and economic processes, un-
satisfactory intellectual property protection, and the ever-present 
threat of violent upheaval and conflict present seemingly insurmount-
able obstacles to increased investment.82  Therefore, conditions aimed 
at improving those realities are necessary and entirely consistent with 
AGOA’s purpose of promoting political and economic reform and 
development. 
C. 2003 AGOA Country Report Analysis 
Most sub-Saharan countries have performed neither brilliantly 
nor awfully vis-à-vis AGOA eligibility and must therefore be ana-
lyzed with great scrutiny.  The records of a few states, though, are so 
obvious that they speak for themselves.  Two examples on opposite 
sides of the spectrum are Botswana and Liberia.  Botswana, despite 
being the country with the highest HIV/AIDS infection rate in the 
world, boasts a great record on transparent, democratic governance 
and offers not only universal health care and anti-retroviral therapy 
to all of its AIDS patients, but also receives strong marks on respect 
for human rights and labor rights.83  Economically, it maintains a 
highly stable market economy and financial policy, for which it re-
ceived a Standard & Poor’s “A” credit rating.84  It is arguably the least 
corrupt country in Africa and has correctly been rewarded with 
AGOA eligibility, including textile and apparel benefits.85 
Liberia is on the other end of the spectrum.  A repressive, war-
mongering political leadership has enriched itself and brought death 
and misery to its own citizens and its neighbors, fueling conflicts in 
Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire.  Human rights are seemingly non-
existent, a formal economic system has collapsed, and despite Presi-
dent Taylor’s departure, the country remains far from securing a sus-
tainable peace.86 
 
 81. Zachary Goldfarb, Powell Urges Ending African Corruption, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 
2003, at A7. 
 82. See AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 29 (prepared statement of Ste-
phen Hayes) ("The nations of Africa themselves clearly have a major responsibility in creating 
the economic and political climate necessary for business investment."). 
 83. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 71–72. 
 84. Id. at 71. 
 85. Id. (noting that five Botswanan firms are exporting textiles under AGOA). 
 86. See generally David White, U.S. Pullout from Liberia Raises Security Concerns, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Oct 1, 2003, at 10 ("[The] country remains divided into three, controlled by 
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Evaluating AGOA eligibility for Botswana or Liberia is easy.  In 
most other cases, though, the picture is less clear.  Four examples—
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, and Eritrea—serve as an illustration 
of the reprehensibly cynical manner in which the U.S. government 
applies AGOA’s criteria to countries that have received less media 
attention. 
Burkina Faso failed to obtain AGOA eligibility in 2003.87  Yet, 
the U.S. government’s official evaluation is full of praise for recent 
political developments in this West African state.  It applauds the 
country’s market reforms and good governance, which includes de-
mocratic elections and a severe reduction of corruption and poverty.88  
In fact, Burkina Faso has been the recipient of IMF loans as part of 
its poverty reduction strategy and has graduated from “Highly In-
debted Poor Country” status.89  Additionally, the report deems Burk-
ina Faso “helpful on terrorism.”90  The widely acclaimed evaluation 
by Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that rates coun-
tries’ respect for political and civil liberties, also applauds recent de-
velopments in Burkina Faso.91  Freedom House reports that “gains 
have been made in life expectancy, literacy, and school attendance.”92  
Furthermore, “Burkina Faso has a vibrant free press, and freedom of 
speech is protected by the constitution and generally respected in 
practice.”93  Religious freedom and labor union rights receive protec-
tion, as observed by the many human rights groups that operate freely 
in the country.94  It would thus appear that Burkina Faso meets the 
stated conditions of AGOA.  However, because of its alleged in-
volvement in the rebel insurgency in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire and 
arms shipments to Liberia, the U.S. government declined to certify its 
eligibility for AGOA in 2003.95 
 
former government militias and two rebel movements.  Aid and human rights organisations re-
port continued harassment and abuse of civilians in all three sectors, including widespread rape 
and extortion by armed bands."). 
 87. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 72. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 114 (labeling Burkina Faso "partly free" and 
giving the country an "upward trend arrow due to the holding of legislative elections that were 
more free and fair than in previous years"). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 115. 
 94. See id. 
 95. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 72. 
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It is illuminating to compare Burkina Faso to countries admitted 
into the AGOA club.  For example, Cameroon continues to face in-
ternal political challenges.96  The government rules an undemocratic, 
de facto one-party state and frequently obstructs political meetings 
and harasses journalists.97  Freedom House agrees, noting that “elec-
tions in 2002 . . . were no more free and fair than previous polls.”98  
The judiciary is “ineffective and subject to political influence and cor-
ruption.”99  The government has failed to stop forced and child labor, 
and “has ignored agreements after entering into them with unions,” 
thereby precluding any formal collective bargaining from taking place 
since 1996.100  Most dramatically, “[t]he U.S. Secretary of State has 
expressed concerns to the government about the arrest, arbitrary de-
tention, harsh treatment and torture of opposition politicians, human 
rights activists, and other citizens.  There are credible reports that se-
curity forces committed extra-judicial killings.”101 
Despite this condemning indictment of Cameroon’s political and 
human rights policies, the country is eligible for AGOA, including 
textiles and apparel benefits.102  To explain this outcome, one must 
look to economics.  In 2002, Cameroon exported duty-free products 
worth $116 million to the United States—overwhelmingly oil.103  The 
country receives high marks on its treatment of international inves-
tors.104  It has engaged in extensive privatization of formerly state-
owned production, including the sale of its power utility to a U.S. 
corporation.105  Most importantly, it is host to the United States’ 
“largest investment in sub-Saharan Africa,” the Chad-Cameroon 
pipeline project.106  Thus, the plausible explanation for Cameroon’s 
 
 96. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 127.  The report ranks Cameroon in its 2003 
country report as "not free."  Id. 
 97. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 74–75. 
 98. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 127. 
 99. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 75 ("The judiciary is regarded as in-
effective and subject to political influence and corruption."). 
 100. Id. at 75. 
 101. Id.; see also FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 128 (reporting that Amnesty In-
ternational called for investigations into dozens of extra-judicial executions). 
 102. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 74. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  However, the USTR also notes that, "[f]oreign investors have sometimes found it 
difficult to obtain enforcement of their legal rights."  Id. at 74. 
 105. Id.  Additionally, it has granted a cobalt mining concession to a U.S. firm.  Id. 
 106. Emmanuel Tumanjong, First Crude Shipped in West Africa Project, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Oct. 5, 2003, at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/news/press_coverage_1003.pdf (last 
visited May 5, 2004).  Although the project is carried out under the auspices of the World Bank, 
091504 FUHR.DOC 10/18/2004  9:56 AM 
144 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:125 
admission lies in the narrow-minded attempt by the U.S. government 
to secure a continually welcoming investment climate for U.S. corpo-
rate entities, as part of its strategy to become less dependent on Mid-
dle Eastern oil. 
Chad could be called Cameroon’s twin brother, for the abuses 
committed by its government are equally serious.107  Chad’s progress 
toward political pluralism and the rule of law are deemed “disap-
pointing,” with its presidential elections of 1996 and 2001 marked by 
irregularities and fraud.108  Anticorruption laws are not enforced, and 
the judiciary is the victim of frequent executive interference.109  
Chad’s human rights record is appalling.  There is widespread evi-
dence of arbitrary and prolonged detention, extra-judicial killings, 
torture, beatings and rape committed by government agents.110  While 
unions ostensibly have the right to organize, they are subject to gov-
ernment interference, and participation in strikes is punishable by 
imprisonment with forced labor.111  Despite the country’s slow pro-
gress on privatization, it was nevertheless approved for AGOA.  
Again, the most likely explanation is the prestigious Chad-Cameroon 
oil pipeline project and the Bush administration’s attempt to protect 
the U.S. corporate interests involved.112 
Eritrea is another compelling example.  Applying the explicit 
AGOA criteria, this small East African nation by the Red Sea falls 
short on the political, economic, and human rights fronts.113  In 2002, 
 
two U.S. oil corporations are major stakeholders, namely ExxonMobile with 40 percent and 
ChevronTexaco with 25 percent.  Id. 
 107. Elizabeth Becker, World Bank Inaugurates Oil Pipeline in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 3, 
2003, at W1.  Becker also notes, "Chad and Cameroon are failing on environmental, social and 
poverty alleviation grounds."  Id. at W7. 
 108. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 78.  See also FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, 
supra note 62, at 135 (characterizing Chad as "not free"). 
 109. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 78. 
 110. Id.  Freedom House agrees.  It admonishes that "[s]ecurity forces routinely ignore con-
stitutional protections regarding search, seizure, and detention.  Overcrowding, disease, and 
malnutrition make prison conditions life threatening, and many inmates spend years in prison 
without charges."  FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 137. 
 111. 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 78. 
 112. The Chad government's priorities are evidenced by its initial use of the money it re-
ceived for the pipeline project.  "Embarrassed World Bank officials have already admitted that 
the notoriously corrupt Chad government has spent the first [10 million pounds] of grant money 
it received from the consortium on arms for its security forces rather than on the educational 
and development projects for which the money was intended."  Paul Brown, Chad Oil Pipeline 
Condemned for Harming the Poor, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 27, 2002, at 15. 
 113. See, e.g., Dan Connell, Redeeming the Failed Promise of Eritrea, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
10, 2003, at A17 ("[W]ith the Asmara government refusing to implement the Constitution, post-
poning national elections, arresting critics, shutting down the independent press, and banning 
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the government “continued its repressive policy of allowing neither 
opposition nor independent organizations in the political or civil 
sphere.”114  The U.S. government bemoans the dictatorship’s tendency 
to shut down the independent press and arrest journalists and politi-
cal dissidents, who are often held in prison without any charges or 
prospects for trial.115  While Eritrea has the formal structures of a 
market economy and has started to lower tariff barriers, it currently 
provides no intellectual property protection and has been instituting 
economic reforms very slowly.116  Eritrea’s “poor human rights record 
worsened in 2002,”117 as the “government has maintained a hostile at-
titude towards civil society and has refused international assistance 
designed to support the development of pluralism in society.”118  The 
accumulation of these realities has brought Eritrea the dubious dis-
tinction of being featured in a special report to the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, as one of  the “World’s Most Repres-
sive Regimes.”119 
Unlike Chad or Cameroon, Eritrea conducts almost no trade 
with the United States.120  So why might the Bush administration be 
interested in awarding Eritrea the status of AGOA membership?  As 
part of the global war on terrorism, Eritrea suddenly has achieved 
great strategic importance as the United States is expanding its mili-
tary presence in the Horn of Africa.  It has hosted several visits by 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the U.S. military 
 
rival parties, the country's trajectory follows a familiar path toward highly coercive one-man 
rule."). 
 114. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, at 198.  Eritrea received a "not free" rating.  In 
its international relations, "Eritrea's aggressive foreign policy has contributed significantly to 
regional instability."  Id. at 199. 
 115. See, e.g., Frank Smyth, U.S.'s New Friend Could Pose Problems, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2002, at B5 ("Until recently, U.S. military ties with Eritrea were restricted 
because of the crackdown on civil liberties.  In October, the State Department raised human 
rights concerns on the anniversary of the jailing of two of its Eritrean employees . . . . The Eri-
trean government is not known to have filed charges against any prisoner . . . . Meanwhile, the 
government's allegations that they were part of a foreign-backed plot remain unsubstanti-
ated."). 
 116. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 84. 
 117. Id.; see also Rory Carroll, Eritrean Children Locked Up For Having Bibles, Says Am-
nesty, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 20, 2003, at 20. 
 118. FREEDOM HOUSE 2003, supra note 62, 199. 
 119. See generally FREEDOM HOUSE, THE WORLD'S MOST REPRESSIVE REGIMES 2003, 27–
30 (2003), at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/mrr2003.pdf (last visited May 24, 2004). 
 120. See 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, supra note 56, at 83. ("[E]xports in 2002 were neg-
ligible.  No new U.S. investment was reported."). 
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commander for the Middle East, General Tommy Franks.121  Eritrea’s 
government was part of the “coalition of the willing” in the Iraq war 
and is offering base rights to the U.S. military, arguably “to woo the 
Bush administration into ignoring its repressive measures.”122  By cer-
tifying its eligibility for AGOA, the U.S. government is “propping up 
this repressive regime as a Cold War–style political payoff for joining 
the ‘war on terrorism.’”123 
Ultimately, as of January 2004, the U.S. government withdrew 
AGOA membership from Eritrea.  Because Eritrea’s performance 
did not improve throughout 2003, the USTR finally pulled the plug 
and expelled Eritrea.124  While this step is laudable, it does not alter 
the underlying analysis—the acceptance of a country for AGOA 
merely out of strategic foreign policy reasons, without regard for the 
conditions aimed at genuine political and economic reform. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the IMF has little in common with AGOA, both re-
gimes could substantially improve their ability to help developing 
countries by applying conditionality consistently with their official 
rhetoric and objectives.125  To improve AGOA, the U.S. government 
should rigorously enforce the Act’s articulated criteria.  In theory, 
AGOA’s conditions supply countries with an attractive carrot, by 
providing them with beneficial market access as a consequence of 
their own policy choices—or a hurtful stick, by excluding them from 
beneficial market access as a consequence of their own policy choices.  
In reality, the current certification process makes a mockery of those 
conditions and undermines the credibility and reputation of the U.S. 
government’s efforts in Africa and beyond.  
It appears as if not all conditions are created equal, or perhaps 
some are more equal than others.  In particular, demands for political 
pluralism, the protection of civil, human, and worker’s rights, and the 
fight against corruption—those conditions that primarily benefit do-
 
 121. Smyth, supra note 115, at B5. 
 122. Connell, supra note 113, at A17. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra note 65. 
 125. In the case of AGOA, the U.S. government should also waive the harmful rule-of-
origin requirement and substantially increase funding for technical trade capacity building of the 
region.  Since 1999, the U.S. government has only provided a meager $345 million for that pur-
pose.  See AGOA Foreign Relations Hearing, supra note 56, at 26 (prepared statement of Ste-
phen Hayes). 
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mestic populations in sub-Saharan Africa—often take a back-seat to 
strategic interests of the U.S. government and U.S. investors. 
The rationale behind the AGOA conditions demanding political 
and economic reform is plausible and positive, as such changes will 
ideally result in more international economic transactions, more 
transparent and democratic governance, and in better lives for sub-
Saharan Africans.  Unfortunately, a secondary condition which 
blandly refers to “foreign policy interests”126 is being abused in an en-
tirely self-serving manner.  The U.S. government is effectively dis-
playing schizophrenic and distasteful behavior: it enforces only those 
conditions that are in its immediate self-interest and in the process 
tolerates and rewards governance standards which AGOA sets out to 
discourage. 
While the primary conditions speak to a wide array of political, 
economic, social, judicial, and human development, the certification 
scheme is directed and authored by one single agency within the U.S. 
government bureaucracy, the Office of the United States Trade Rep-
resentative.  Unsurprisingly, the result is an undue emphasis on eco-
nomic interests, at the expense of conditions focused on political plu-
ralism, democracy, health, education, and human rights.  A broader 
and more formal interagency process, incorporating high-level repre-
sentatives from relevant State Department offices, the Treasury De-
partment, the Agency for International Development, and the Na-
tional Security Council, might produce a more balanced evaluation 
mechanism.127  Beyond instituting these structural improvements, the 
U.S. government must resist the temptation to use AGOA in a selfish 
manner.  It must remember that AGOA is intended to be a device to 
encourage sub-Saharan African governments to pursue policies that 
will positively affect the well-being and development of their own 
people.128 
In contrast, the IMF’s shortcomings stem not from selfish mo-
tives but from an institutional failure to look beyond basic macroeco-
nomic figures in order to examine the long-term causes of its clients’ 
economic woes.  In particular, the IMF should include corruption and 
 
 126. AGOA § 104(2). 
 127. Currently, to determine country eligibility, the USTR chairs the Subcommittee of the 
Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC).  The Committee receives information from U.S. embas-
sies, U.S. government agencies, and other public comments that have been posted to the Fed-
eral Register.  While it formally resembles interagency meetings, the eligibility results suggest a 
lack of sufficient input form other departments and agencies. 
 128. See AGOA § 103. 
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transparency in governance as important factors in its funding deci-
sions.  Since corruption is inversely related to a country’s long-term 
fiscal and monetary stability, greater IMF involvement in the struggle 
for transparency in government would comport with the Fund’s mis-
sion.129  In fact, the IMF’s official rhetoric already acknowledges that 
the institution should play a role in fighting corruption.130  Unfortu-
nately, the decision-makers at the Fund have not acted consistently 
with their rhetoric, but have allowed corruption to take a back seat to 
more superficial and short-term macroeconomic concerns. 
We are not arguing that the beneficiary countries of IMF and 
AGOA should meet unattainable goals.  We recognize that AGOA’s 
eligibility standard is “making continual progress”131 toward comply-
ing with the conditions, not constructing a postmodern liberal democ-
racy overnight.  Yet, when countries undoubtedly make “continual 
regress” they must be denied AGOA benefits.  All that is required is 
a basic consistency and honesty in the interpretation of the U.S. 
Trade Representative–authored country reports. 
Similarly, we do not believe that the IMF should suspend pay-
ments as soon as corruption is found, but only that corruption should 
be treated as a genuine factor in the Fund’s decision-making process.  
Financial disclosure requirements on borrower countries (and on 
their government officials) would send a clear message to corrupt re-
gimes that actions have consequences.  The recent scandal involving 
Argentina’s former economy minister Cavallo132 affirms the popular 
view that the IMF does nothing to prevent the very officials with 
whom it negotiates from robbing their country blind.  Taking a more 
active role in the fight against corruption would prove beneficial to 
the IMF and its clients: it would enhance the Fund’s sullied reputa-
tion, and improve transparency and accountability in borrower gov-
ernments.133  Thus, the Fund would contribute more effectively to its 
clients’ development, and in the process decrease the risk of default. 
David Fuhr & Zachary Klughaupt 
 
 129. See IMF Articles, supra note 1, art. I.  See also IMF, REVISED CODE OF GOOD 
PRACTICES ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (2001), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/ 
code.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004). 
 130. See also supra note 25. 
 131. AGOA § 104. 
 132. See supra note 27. 
 133. The Fund's recent actions in the Dominican Republic are a welcome step in the right 
direction.  See Dominican Republic in Crisis, supra note 25, at A16. 
